Earlier this month, the Tennessee Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of reversing the 2023 first-degree murder convictions of a Memphis woman named Laronda Turner, dismissing the charges against her completely.

It did so based on a rule that has been in place in Tennessee as long as the court itself. Known as the accomplice corroboration rule, the longstanding piece of common law prevents a criminal defendant from being convicted based solely on the testimony of their alleged accomplice. In other words, a prosecutor must also present some evidence to support that testimony in order for a conviction to stand. 

The court determined that prosecutors failed to clear that bar in Turner’s case. 

But, the court also determined hers would be the last case in which this rule applied. They abolished the accomplice corroboration rule completely. 

The move alarmed defense attorneys and other advocates who saw it as a needless weakening of the protections for people facing serious criminal charges. 

Outgoing Justice Sharon Lee lamented the court majority’s decision in a dissent that called the rule “a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants against untrustworthy accomplice testimony.”

“The rule is needed because accomplice testimony is inherently suspect,” Lee wrote, going on to note that, “[a]n accomplice may tell a self-serving story to exonerate himself, shift blame to an accused, or curry favor with the prosecution. Having been a party to the crime, an accomplice is susceptible to promises of leniency or threats of punishment.” 

Jessica Van Dyke, executive director of the Tennessee Innocence Project, which filed an amicus brief in the Turner case, told the Banner the court’s decision raises the risk of wrongful convictions. 

“This change will impact people in Tennessee and could potentially make it easier for innocent people to get convicted,” she said. 

It also, Van Dyke said, highlights an even greater need for law enforcement investigators and prosecutors to record all statements by alleged accomplices ahead of trial. 

In the court’s majority opinion, Justice Jeff Bivins noted that Tennessee was the only state that maintained an accomplice corroboration rule as a matter of common law. In the 16 other states that observe a similar rule, the doctrine is found in a statute or a rule of criminal procedure. And so, although the court’s majority recognized that there are “valid concerns regarding the reliability of accomplice testimony … the General Assembly is better suited to decide whether such a rule need be effectuated in our state.”    

Kevin McGee, a veteran defense attorney who also serves as training director for Tennessee’s Public Defenders Conference, questioned the court’s rationale for dispensing with a precedent that has been in place since the late 19th century. He noted that the court had been under little pressure to address the rule, citing a section in Lee’s dissent in which she says the state raised the issue “in the 11th hour” and “did so half-heartedly.” McGee emphasized that the court’s decision eliminates a threshold that was not particularly high to begin with.  

“When we talk about corroboration, we’re not talking about [saying] there has to be other witnesses or there has to be DNA evidence or anything like that,” he told the Banner. “The courts have upheld corroboration of very minor details that put a person at the scene where they would have committed a crime. So it’s not been some insurmountable hurdle that a prosecutor has to overcome in my experience at all.”

And yet, he said, that hurdle did provide some protection for criminal defendants whose alleged accomplices might be motivated to offer false or misleading testimony. As McGee noted, defense attorneys are already barred from telling the jury about the sentence the defendants in a case are facing, lest jurors’ feelings about a harsh potential punishment affect their decision on a person’s guilt or innocence.

With the accomplice corroboration rule gone, McGee said, the testimony of an alleged accomplice can be presented to a jury without supporting evidence or context about the potential prison sentence that may well be motivating them.